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Psychiatry: A "Value-Free" Science? 
by 
Msgr. Cormac Burke 
Msgr. Burke is a former Irish civil lawyer and presently a member of 
the Roman Rota, the High Court of the Roman Catholic Church. 
The following is extracted from the "In lure Section " (i. e. , the legal 
considerations) of a sentence of July 9, 1998, regarding the nullity of 
marriage, handed down by the Roman Rota. The rotal "Turnus " or 
panel of judges deciding the case was presided over by Msgr. Burke, 
who also wrote the decision. 
2. This case hinges on whether, under c. 1095, 3 , a person with a 
homosexual tendency can validly consent to marriage. The main 
jurisprudential principles governing the question are well established and 
will be briefly recalled. In recent years, however, radical changes have 
marked many secular appreciations of homosexuality, perhaps especially 
within the field of psychiatry and psychology; and these changes certainly 
merit consideration, also so as to weigh their possible effect on canonical 
jurisprudence. 
3. Homosexuality "is a disorder of the instinct, or that natural 
tendency (psychologically, physically and affectively) of one sex towards 
the other, which in the nature of things, that is through the Creator of 
nature, leads and urges people to that union of man and woman which is 
marriage" (c. Huot, Jan . 28, 1974: R.R.Dec. , vol. 66, p. 28)' ; homosexuality 
"is therefore considered a pathological state of the sexual instinct" (c. 
Pompedda, Oct. 6, 1969: vol. 61 , p. 917). 
"The incapacity for assuming certain substantial matrimonial 
obligations, as occurs in some graver cases of homosexuality, can certainly 
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not be hannonized with the nature of matrimonial consent" (c. Anne, Feb. 
6, 1973: vol. 65, p. 64); "which principle has been followed without 
exception in later jurisprudence of our Apostolic Tribunal" (c. Funghini, 
Dec. 19, 1994: vol. 86, pp . 769-770) . It follows that "not every expression 
of homosexuality can impede marriage. Homosexuality can only do so 
when one or other spouse suffers from true, i.e. grave and irreversible, 
homosexuality" (c. Pompedda, Oct. 19, 1992: vol. 84, p. 496). 
Further, even if "according to doctrine and jurisprudence, 
homosexuality is a disordered instinct, that is, a serious affliction of the 
mind" (c. Pinto, Apr. 17, 1997. n. 4) , jurisprudence distinguishes not only 
between grave and less grave cases of homosexuality, but also between a 
homosexual tendency that is transient and one that is deep-rooted, and 
again between an acquired homosexual condition and one that would seem 
to be constitutional: "among those who suffer a perversion or rather an 
inversion in the erotic appetite, one needs to distinguish those who give 
way to this aberration only trans iently and on certain occasions, or 
impelled by circumstances of place or time, and who easily return to the 
right order when freed from these circumstances; these without doubt are 
in a totally different situation to others who either out of a habit finnly 
contracted over a long period (i .e. who have become homosexuals), or from 
their own constitutional makeup (who are therefore abnormal from birth), 
are irresistibly attracted to their own sex: which medical opinion considers 
to have originated in an organic cause or from a pathological psychic 
condition " (c . Pompedda, Oct. 6, 1969: vol. 61 , p. 916) . 
4. In relation to the proof of an incapacitating homosexual condition, 
"as always occurs when the issue is incapacity for marriage, there must be 
proof of the gravity and the incurability of the [homosexual] disorder. For 
a slight inhibition or one that can be cured would give rise to an imperfect 
and perhaps also unhappy marriage, over a period or indefinitely. But the 
object of an incapacity is a null marriage, not one that is simply imperfect 
or difficult to live up to" (c . Serrano, July 28, 1981 : vol. 73 , p. 423). 
Just as in other cases concerning possible consensual incapacity, in 
keeping with c. 1680 ("In cases of.. . defect of consent due to mental illness, 
the judge is to use the services of one or more experts"), jurisprudence has 
regularly considered recourse to medico-psychiatric experts as an 
important element within the probatory process of grave homosexuality. 
Truly qualified experts in the matter can help judges mature their decision 
in "such a difficult and complex matter" as homosexuality (c. De 
Lanversin: Jan. 26, 1996, n. II). "Regarding proof: inasmuch as not every 
type of homosexual perversion but that alone which is grave and incurable, 
can invalidate consent, the judges must weigh the matter well in each 
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individual case, also seeking the opinion of experts - which it would be 
rash to ignore without serious reasons" (c. Parisella, May 11, 1978: vol. 70, 
p. 292). "It is obvious how necessary in these cases is the aid of experts, in 
order both to verify the existence of homosexuality and to diagnose its true 
nature and gravity" (c . Stankiewicz, Nov. 24, 1983: vol. 75 , p. 683). 
"Regarding the proof of the existence of homosexuality such as to cause a 
person to contract marriage invalidly, apart from the facts and evidence 
produced, one needs to give accurate study to the expert opinions, which in 
practice as always needed to define the nature of this defect, and above all 
to distinguish its gravity" (c . De Lanversin: Jan. 26, 1996, n. 11). The 
premise here is evidently that psychiatric experts, with greater knowledge 
about the pathological nature of homosexuality, can provide the judge with 
a trustworthy and scientifically grounded opinion about the gravity of the 
homosexual condition in a particular case. 
5. To what extent should these principles be modified in the light of 
the radically changed position of so much the secular world with regard to 
homosexual ity? 
Until twenty or thirty years ago, homosexual conduct, even 
between consenting adults, was treated as a criminal offense in civil law, 
and was socially considered an unacceptable deviation. This was reflected 
in psychiatry, where it was universally held to be a psychic illness needing 
therapeutic attention. In 1973 however, the American Psychiatric 
Association (or rather its Board; see below, no. 30), despite no small 
number of dissenting voices from within the psychiatric profession itself, 
eliminated homosexuality from the listed classification of a mental 
disorder, then in 1980 restricted any diagnosis of pathology to cases where 
homosexuality caused subjective distress ("ego-dystonic" homosexuality), 
limited this further in 1987, and finall y in \ 994 removed homosexuality 
completely from any categorization as a personality disorder. 
6. Currently it is often asserted, and perhaps popularly believed, that 
the traditional evaluation of homosexuality as an anomalous condition has 
been proved wrong by scientific advance . One reads for instance: "As a 
result of scientific discussion, the American Psychiatric Association in 
1973 eliminated homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses and, in 
\ 980, dropped it from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders" (Encarla Multimedia Encyclopedia, CD-ROM 1998 edition: 
under "Homosexuality"). Ecclesiastical jurisprudence cannot remain 
indifferent to these great changes, being bound rather to examine what 
theoretical or practical effect they may have on the canonical appreciation 
of homosexuality, in particular with regard to capacity for valid marital 
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consent. 
7. The case before the court today invites us also to look briefly at the 
thesis that homosexuality can be classified as a personality disorder only 
when it is "dystonic", not when it is "syntonic" . This thesis, expressed in 
these unusual terms of differentiation , was introduced into DSM-III (1980), 
maintained even if with a certain veiling in DSM-III-R (1987), and then 
dropped completely in DSM-IV (1994) when all mention of homosexuality 
disappeared from this handbook of the American Psychiatric Association . 
The distinction however is still invoked by no few psychiatrists. In the 
case before us the affirmative decision of the appeal court, as well as the 
petitioner's rotal advocate, highlight the court expert's opinion in second 
instance that the respondent suffered from "egodystonic lesbianism", or 
"egodystonic homosexuality". 
8. The changes noted above, r,egarding the psychiatric classification 
of homosexuality, generate considerable puzzlement. They raise questions 
concerning many current evaluations of homosexuality, and provoke 
doubts especially as to whether these can be harmonized with the Christian 
vision of sexuality and of its place in the healthy and integral development 
of man . More in particular, they necessarily inspire serious concerns about 
the scientific reliability of certain new and extremely influential theses that 
have risen in a very brief period to an authoritative position in 
contemporary psychiatry and psychology. 
9. While these particular changes are not exclusive to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM"), they are specially 
noticeable in this Manual , each new edition of which has been marked by 
numberless additions, omissions and reformulations covering many other 
fields besides homosexuality. No doubt in most cases these represent 
conclusions of research work that has been guided by exclusively scientific 
criteria. However many prominent psychiatrists maintain that this has not 
always been the case. Some in fact maintain that psychiatrists cannot be 
said to operate with an absolutely "neutral" scientific mind, for value 
judgments always underpin their work. 
The importance of this for jurisprudential purposes is all the more 
evident when one recalls that in ,:ases concerning possible consensual 
incapacity for marriage (and in keeping with c . 1680), canonical tribunals 
have come to rely heavily on experts in psychiatry and psychology, while 
these experts themselves tend to invoke DSM more and more. Judges tend 
to have a copy of DSM to hand and very frequently ask periti to give their 
diagnoses using DSM classifications, in the conviction that this provides 
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the judge with a means to calibrate the scientific reliability of an expert 
opinIOn. 
10. DSM is not only utilized by the American psychiatric profession, 
but has now become a manual of international use, having been translated 
into all the leading languages. Special note must be made of the enormous 
authority which it has come to enjoy in church tribunals and among 
ecclesiastical court experts. In rota I jurisprudence itself, DSM is described 
in a way that reflects the frequency of its use: it is called the "renowned 
work" (vol. 81 , p. 311; vol. 84, p. 266); "It is therefore worth referring to 
this work which is today easily the leading account of mental disorders" 
(vol. 85 , p. 625), "the greatly used text" (vol. 84, p. 648), "the constantly 
used list of mental disorders" (vol. 85 , p. 624), "the well known DSM 
Manual" (vol. 87. p. 151), and its terminology as the "commonly 
recognized listing" (vol. 83 , p. 766). In rotal sentences of the period 1990-
1995 which treat of consensual incapacity, DSM is referred to some 200 
times. 
II. Two main questions about this Diagnostic Manual call for 
consideration: a) its reliability from the strictly scientific viewpoint, as a 
trustworthy source of unbiased knowledge; b) its harmony or otherwise, at 
least in areas such as the one that concerns us today, with the Christian 
concept of man. Both questions are of major concern to ecclesiastical 
judges and advocates, as well as to court experts working in the service of 
church tribunals . 
12 . In approaching the first question, it is helpful to take note of the 
genesis and development of DSM itself. The first edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Menial Disorders, which listed some 60 mental 
disorders, was in 1952. Dr. Morton Kramer and Dr. Robert L. Spitzer were 
main consultants in its production and also in that of the second edition 
(1968), revised under the aegis of the American Psychiatric Association. 
The terms settled on by DSM-If became "the official nomenclature for 
American psychiatrists on July I, 1968" (DSM-Il , p. 120). The work was 
greatly revised and expanded in its third edition, DSM-IIf, published in 
1980. Dr. Robert L. Spitzer was again the main consultant for this work. 
DSM-IIf-R appeared in 1987. Another major revision resulted in DSM-IV, 
which was published in 1994 and lists more than 300 mental disorders. 
13 . Opinions among p5ychiatrists about the scientific reliability of 
DSM. There is very considerable professional disagreement between 
psychiatrists themselves about whether the development of DSM has 
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always been shaped by pure ly sc ient ifi c judgments, and therefo re whether 
many of the diagnostical parameters it proposes can claim to be of a 
properly scientific and validated nature. Tribunal personne l clearly need to 
be aware both of the exi stence and the extent of these differences of 
opinIOn. 
Dr. Melvin Sabshin , a noted U. S. psychiatri st, delivered the Adolf 
Meyer lecture - "Turning Po int s in Twentieth-Century American 
Psychiatry" - to the 1989 meetin g of the American Psychiatric Association 
(American Journal of Psychiatry . vo l. 147 [1990], pp. 1267- 1274). Dr. 
Sabshin notes how DSM came into be ing in the 1950-1960s to counter the 
w idespread public feeling that psychiatry both lacked a suffic iently 
scientific base and was subject to manipulation by other inte rests in 
society. "Publicity about psychiatri sts testifying on opposite sides of 
insanity defense pleas brought o ut enormous critic ism about the 
unreliability of psychiatric diagnos is" (p . 1272). DSM was an attempt to 
prove that psychiatric disorders could be objecti ve ly diagnosed . Evidently, 
a first condition to establi sh and safeguard the scientific repute of the 
Manual is that it should be seen to have shielded itself from non-scientific 
pressures. In this respect while Dr. Sabshin has no do ubt that "DSM-III 
and DSM-III-R have influenced American psychiatry profo undly", he goes 
on "but they have also been influe nced by forces outside the fie ld" ( ib. 
1271 ); repeating on the fo llowing page that they have not always been 
successful in resisting pressure from non-scientific po litical and soc ial 
activi sts (ib. 1272). 
14. The doubts expressed by Dr. Sabshin had already been a ired within 
the psychiatric profess ion. afte r the publication o f DSM-III in 1980. The 
American Journal of P.~ychiatry in 1984 carried an important "Debate on 
DSM-III" with Dr. Robert L. Spitzer, Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia 
Univers ity, New York, and the main mind behind DSM-III , responding to 
critici sms from other prominent psychiatri sts (A merican Journal of 
P5ychiatry , vo l. 141 . pp . 53 9-553: c f. al so the judgment coram the 
unders igned of November 25 . 199~.: vo l. 85 , pp . 706-707). The debate 
shows that even supporte rs of DS M-I11 admit the unsc ientific character of 
many of the changes it introduces, and urge that future deve lopments 
should be more solidly based. Dr. Gerald L. Klerman , Professor of 
Psychi atry at Harvard Medica l Schoo l, requests that "the changes that 
[will] appear in DSM-I V should be dete rmined by the state of evidence 
rather than the assertions of competing ideological camps" ("The 
Advantages of DSM-lIl ": p. 540), \\' hile Dr. George E. Va illant, Professor 
of Psychiatry at Dartmouth Medical School, holds: "DS M-l\I represents a 
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bold series of choices based on guess, taste, prejudice, and hope. Some of 
these choices are undoubtedly right, but few are based on fact or truth ... 
Certainly I hope that the authors of DSM-IV will rectify the mistakes of 
DSM-III" ("The Disadvantages of DSM-1I1 outweigh its Advantages": ibid. 
p. 545 [emphasis added]). 
Dr. Vaillant goes on to detail his Criticisms. The first is that 
"DSM-III is parochial : [it] ignores other cultures and other historical 
epochs and ignores any aspect of learning that does not come under the 
heading of American practical technology" (ibid. 542). Dr. Robert L. 
Spitzer in effect accepts this criticism : "First, [Dr. Vaillant] states that 
DSM-III is "parochial" because we ignored other cultures. That may be the 
case, but the mandate was to develop a classification of mental disorders 
for use in this country. We certainly were not told to worry about the 
complex problems involved in developing a system that could be used 
throughout the world" (ibid . 546). It is not certain that this important 
clarification has been adequately noted in translations of DSM and in the 
use made of it (and of works based on it) in different countries. The 
Introduction to the latest edition of DSM points out: "Applying Personality 
Disorder criteria across cultural settings may be especially difficult 
because of the wide cultural variation in concepts of self, styles of 
communication, and coping mechanisms" (DSM-IV, xxiv). 
15. Dr. Vaillant applies his censure of the "parochial" nature 
characterizing many diagnostical criteria proposed by DSM-III particularly 
to "antisocial", "borderline" and "narcissistic" personality disorders. He 
relates how DSM's description of "anti social disorder" seemed "utterly 
preposterous" to experienced European psychiatrists. He goes on: "How 
much more vulnerable than antisocial personality are the classifications of 
borderline and narcissistic personality di sorders! Only 10-20 years old, 
these disorders are still usually observed only in American cities that have 
opera houses and psychoanalytic institutes. Borderline and narcissistic 
personalities are rarely seen in Iowa City or in Mobile; certainly, they are 
not recognized in Tangiers or Bucharest" (ib. 543). While a sentence 
coram Colagiovanni notes the novelty of the narci ssistic classification: 
"from 1980 the classification «Narci ss istic Personality Disorder» (cf. 
DSM-III) was introduced" (May 17. 1994. no. 17: unpublished), references 
to narcissistic disorder appear at least 85 times in cases brought to and 
judged by the Rota between 1990 and 1996 . 
16. Another psychiatri st recalls "embarrassments" that the psychiatric 
profession has had to undergo due to evidence of diagnostic unreliability, 
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and cites the "Rosenhan study". "In that study 19 nonnal subjects 
presented themselves to psychiatric hospitals complaining of a putative 
symptom; each said that he or she heard a voice saying "thud". All were 
hospitalized, and all acted "normally" while hospitalized . And all were 
discharged with the diagnosis of "schizophrenia in remission". This study 
was reported in the journal Science under the ominous title "Being Sane in 
Insane Places". Rosenhan interpreted his results to assail the unreliability 
of psychiatric assessment and the dangerousness of misdiagnosis (Dr. 
Mitchell Wilson, "DSM-III and the Transformation of American 
Psychiatry": American Journal of P!>J!chiatry, vol. ISO (1993), 404). 
17 . The self-doubts about the reliability ofOSM continue to be voiced 
at the highest level within the psychiatric profession. In a very recent 
editorial of the American Journal of Psychiatry, we read: "the new DSM 
diagnostic process has dominated the: research, teaching, and contemporary 
practice of psychiatry. The DSM diagnosis has almost become a thing in 
itself - a certainty of ' concrete ' dimensions. The DSM diagnosis has 
become the main goal of clinical practice. DSM-IV, as ' allegedly' being 
more data based, has even assumed the aura of allowing psychiatry to keep 
pace with the rest of medicine as a ' technological triumph '; but our current 
diagnostic process and zeal may also be ruining the essence of psychiatry. 
It is time to look at what we have wrought and make some midcourse 
corrections... The current DSM process gives the image of precision and 
exactnesss. In fact, many have come to believe that we are dealing with 
clear and discrete disorders rather than arbitrary symptom clusters... All of 
this apparent precision overlooks the fact that as yet, we have no identified 
etiological agents for psychiatric disorders. Our diagnoses are nowhere 
near the precision of the diagnostic processes in the rest of medicine" 
("Putting DSM-IV in Perspective" : American Journal of Psychiatry vol. 
155 [1998], p. 159; emphasis added) . 
18. In justice to the editors of DSM, it must be said that from the outset 
they have clearly stated the limited purpose of their Manual: "The purpose 
of DSM is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to 
enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, 
and treat people with various mental disorders" (DSM-III-R, xxix; DSM-
IV, xxvii). DSM-IV repeats the "Cautionary Statement" of DSM-III-R; but 
expands it with a specific caveat about the "Use of DSM-IV in Forensic 
Settings": "When the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions 
are employed for forensic purposes, there are significant risks that 
diagnostic infonnation will be misu sed or misunderstood. These dangers 
arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern 
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to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis. In most 
situations, the clinical diagnosi s of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not 
sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a ' mental 
disorder', ' mental disability ', 'mental disease ', or ' mental defect ' . In 
determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard (e.g. for 
competence, criminal responsibility, or disability), additional information 
is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV diagnosis" (DSM-
IV , p. xxiii). 
A rotal peritus in a 1992 case would seem to have had this in mind 
when he observed: "DSM-III-R has been and is still subject to strong 
criticism because of the criteria according to which it has been 
formulated" , and "as the Preface itse lf to the Manuals states, the diagnostic 
criteria used may not be relevant for medico-legal purposes" . The expert 
adds : "It must not be forgotten that DSM-III-R originated as a Manual to be 
used for epidemiological purposes (that is, for the classification of 
diseases), and was only subsequently used as an actual 'Manual of 
Psychiatry'" (c. Ragni , May 19, 1992: vol. 84, p. 266). 
19. Nevertheless, DSM continues to exercise a growing influence 
which goes very much beyond its original intention of simply providing a 
common nomenclature. The mode in which it is invoked in the very title of 
certain works seems to illustrate this . For instance, AA. VV., Diagnosi 
psichiatrica e DSM-Ill-R. Aspetti clinici e prospettive medico-Iegali, Milan 
1989; Gabbard G. 0., Psichiatria psicodinamica. Nuova edizione basata 
suI DSM-IV, tr. it. , Milan 1995 . 
No small number of cases coming to the Rota suggest that, for 
some judge9- and experts, the slightest evidence that some of the diagnostic 
criteria proposed by DSM for identifying a psychic disorder were present 
at the time of consent, suffices to prove a party's incapacity for marriage 
under c. 1095 . Such a practice not only pays no attention to the "Cautions" 
given by DSM itself, but ignores two other evident facts: a) DSM, in its 
explicit desi re to be exhaustive, classifies many "disorders" which cannot 
be even remotely connected with capacity for the essential obligations of 
marriage (as c . 1095 requires); b) no less importantly, it passes over the 
clear principle, long establ ished in rotal jurisprudence and recalled in 1987 
by Pope John Paul II , that "an argument for real incapacity can be 
entertained on Iy in the presence of a serious form of anomaly ... " (AAS 79 
(1987) 1457). The editors of DSM-\V seem to have wished to preclude 
such superficial reading or use of their Manual when they write in their 
Introduction : "It is precisely because impairments, abilities, and disabilities 
vary widely within each diagnostic category that assignment of a particular 
diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability" 
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(DSM-IV, p. xxiii) . 
The editors add another "caveat" which is specially significant for 
those who habitually have recourse to DSM for canonical cases under c. 
1095. "The fact that an individual's presentation meets the criteria for a 
DSM-IV diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication regarding the 
individual's degree of control over the behaviors that may be associated 
with the disorder. Even when diminished control over one's behavior is a 
feature of the disorder, having the diagnosi s in itself does not demonstrate 
that a particular individual is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior 
at a particular time" (ibid.). This distinction in DSM between "diminished 
control" and "inability to control", corresponds to the distinction in 
canonical jurisprudence between "difficulty" - which does not invalidate 
consent - and "incapacity", which does. This is firmly established in rota I 
jurisprudence (c. Ewers, April 4, 198 I : vol. 73 , p. 22 I; c . Pompedda, Feb. 
19, 1982: vol. 74, p. 89, c. Agustoni , July 15, 1986: vol. 78, p. 460; c. 
Bruno, Dec. 18, 1987: vol. 79, p. 765 ; c. De Lanversin, Jan. 19, 1994: vol. 
86, p. 5, n. I I; c. Civili , June 15 , 1994 (unpublished); c. Colagiovanni, July 
28, 1994; (unpublished); c. Lopez-lllana, Dec. 14, 1994: vol. 86, p. 691, 
etc.), and was also recalled by the Pope in his address to the Rota in 1987: 
"For the canonist the principle is clear that incapacity alone, and not just 
difficulty, in giving consent and achieving a true community of life and 
love, renders marriage null" (AAS 79 [1987] 1457). 
20. Psychiatry and science. Almost fi fty years ago an authoritative 
article observed: "In mental health, the contribution of organic, 
psychological, and social and ideological factors defies specification. 
There are no methods through which the factors can be observed in 
isolation so that their relative causal significance might be estimated; often 
the factors themselves cannot be identified easily through specific criteria 
that would lead themselves to mea~;urement , comparison, and correlation" 
(Dr. Joseph W. Eaton: "The Asst:ssment of Mental Health", American 
Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 108 [195 I] , pp. 8 I -90). 
In a much more recent article, "Psychiatry is More than a Science" 
(British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 162 [1993] 154- I 60), Dr. R.H. Cawley, 
Emeritus Professor of Psychologica 1 Medicine in the University of London, 
holds that psychiatry, related so much to individuals and dependent on 
many non-analyzable elements, cannot be enclosed in the category of a 
strict science. Having noted that "the raw material of the psychiatrist'S 
work consists of the behaviour, thoughts and emotions, objectively 
expressed and subjectively experienced, of persons in distress and those in 
close contact with them", he goes on to suggest that "there are six crucial 
aspects of our discipline which are in principle unrelated to the basic 
68 Linacre Quarterly 
sciences and yet are central to what we are doing"; these are "the 
uniqueness of the individual, his/her awareness of self, inner feelings, 
empathy, and interaction and alliances with others", which, he claims, "are 
primary experiences, and will never be subsumed under the rules of 
science" (154-157). 
21 . Psychiatry, in its actual practice, uses certain therapies which can 
properly be regarded as scientifically based . This is evident in the 
pharmacological treatment of psychic disorders which has developed so 
notably over recent decades. These developments certainly represent 
scientific progress for psychiatry and allied specialties, even though 
pharmaceutical researchers, and still more psychiatrists, are often unable to 
provide any sure explanation of the cause-effect factors involved. 
Other aspects of therapy, such as psychiatric and psychological 
counselling, often show a great level of skill. Always supposing that this 
counselling is competently done, it seems that here one should speak of the 
increased mastery of an art, rather than of scientific progress. Many use 
this art well, some use it badly; a judgment which depends also on one's 
anthropological presuppositions. 
22. The original and stated goal of DSM - conceived as an aid to 
diagnosis - was (and remains) eminently utilitarian: to elaborate common 
diagnostical terms and criteria for use by practitioners, and thus to reduce 
the difficulties of dialogue and communication which have so beset the 
profession. Hence the purpose was to obtain a practical or political 
arrangement, rather than any real increase in objective knowledge. 
Whatever advances may have been made here are therefore technical more 
than strictly scientific. One would say the same of a new system of 
classification introduced into a university library. 
As we have noted, however, leading psychiatrists consider that the 
original limited and pragmatic purpose of DSM has been extended and 
substantially modified over the past twenty-five years . On the one hand, 
DSM has gradually come to list as psychic "disorders" (each with its 
appropriate symptoms) many character flaws or defective ways of being 
which were previously not considered a maner for psychiatric treatment at 
all. On the other, it has removed from the classification of disorder certain 
conditions which were formerly and universally accepted as gravely 
anomalous . Moreover (as we have seen in part and will now further 
illustrate), quite a number of prominent psychiatrists consider that many of 
these changes have been culturally conditioned, rather than scientifically 
developed. Precisely because of the extraordinary popularity which DSM 
has achieved over a short period of time, it should be borne in mind that 
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popularity is per se no va lidation of intrinsic scientific authority. 
23. Cultural influences on p.\ychiatry . Few psychiatrists would deny 
that concepts of "psychic health" are enormously influenced by current 
standards of acceptable personal or soc ial behavior. Hence the danger that 
both psychiatry and psychology can be unduly subordinated to, or 
manipulated by, prevailing cultural or class values. This danger has often 
been noted in the past, and it is c{:rtainly not less operative today. We 
quote again from the article by Dr. J. Eaton: "Cultural relativity plays a 
much larger role in the fields of mental health and illness than in most 
other fields of medicine. An inflamed appendix has a fairly uniform 
meaning in all cultures that recognize life as a desirable value. If left 
untreated it is a threat to life. Not so in the mental field. Even in the case 
of very unusual behaviors, like suicide, one cannot find complete cross-
cultural uniformity in its interpretation ... in the United States the mental 
hygiene movement has accepted the democratic, worldly, ascetic, 
individualistic, utilitarian , and competitive values of the middle class. Its 
criteria for mental health reflect strong personal and class biases and are 
in part rejected by other sections of the population. Karen Homey 
emphasizes that, even within our culture, concepts of mental health and 
illness vary considerably through time : " .. . If a mature and independent 
woman were to consider herself a 'fa llen woman', ' unworthy of the love of 
a decent man ', because she had sexual relationships, she would be 
suspected of neurosis, at least in many circles of soc iety. Some forty years 
ago, this attitude of guilt would have been considered normal. .. " (Ioc. cit. , 
p. 86). 
"Experts do not agree un the meaning of mental health. 
Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists have personal criteria of the 
requirements to consider a patient ' cured' [or ' healthy ' ]. These criteria 
arise out of their experience and social value orientation. No common 
denominator for these definition s can be found" (ib. 82). "A frank 
recognition of the relativity of mental health will do much to improve both 
research and its application. It will reduce confusion by putting an end to 
the fruitless effort to arrive at a single criterion, which some scientists hope 
would be endowed through some magical process with the 'objectivity' of 
temperature measured by a thermometer. Mental health cannot be reduced 
to such a single dimension . It is a value judgment, with all the 
potentialities for variation and change implicit in such a relativistic entity" 
(ib. 89). 
24. No association of phys icians would seriously consider and debate 
(and much less incorporate into their diagnostical practice) the "scientific" 
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conclusion of a study which holds cancer to be a healthy and not a 
pathological state; and no doubt the same is true, at least for the moment, 
regarding the effects of drug-taking on the human organism. Yet what is 
probably the major official body claiming to speak for psychiatry today 
has, under outside pressure, done exactly this in the matter of 
homosexuality. In other areas, psychiatrists testify to how modem secular 
life-style values shape diagnoses concerning self-identification and self-
fulfillment, maturity of personality, privacy, gender roles, race, social 
status, religious belief, etc. 
25 . Psychiatry and human values. In dealing with the troubled 
workings of the human spirit, psychiatry inevitably (even if perhaps 
unconsciously in some cases) adopts a series of philosophically or morally 
based value judgments: about "concepts of self' (OSM-IV, xxiv; cf. above 
no. 14), about man himself, his nature, his development and end, his 
psychic good and health . Tribunals could take special note of a strikingly 
clear admission - and indeed assertion - of this, also because of the level 
of the professional forum at which it was made. Dr. Alan A. Stone, 
Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard University and 1980 President 
of the American Psychiatric Association, in his Presidential Address to the 
Association - "Conceptual Ambiguity and Morality in Modem Psychiatry" 
- clearly rejected any pretension that psychiatry is a purely scientific 
endeavor, free from any underlying values or moral presuppositions. 
Several passages merit quoting from this significant address (American 
Journal oj Psychiatry, vol. 137 [1980]; pp . 887-891). 
Dr. Stone firm Iy holds that, despite theoretical assertions that 
psychiatry is "value-free", this is not so in practice. "Psychiatry does not 
stand outside history or morality, but how do we decide which history and 
which morality to accept? ... Psychiatrists are taught to avoid value 
judgments in their dealings with patients, but I do not believe I make a 
radical claim when I assert that history and morality are a presence in the 
therapist's office. The only question is how do they get there. The theory 
that excludes history and morality has the power to exculpate without 
disturbing the status quo. Thus the psych iatrist's choice of theory becomes 
crucial" (888). 
With concrete reference to "racism, homosexuality and the 
situation of women" , Dr. Stone insists that "these are all issues which have 
confronted us in our practice, challenged the moral assumptions that lie 
concealed in our theories , and confounded us with disputes and acrimony 
in our Association", also because "each invites psychiatry to take a stand 
on human values" (887). He goes on to note: "Psychiatry has played no 
small part in the transformation of the mind of modern man" ... "The most 
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powerful aspect of psychiatry is its contribution to what it means to be a 
person. This is not under our control , nor can it be in a free society. But 
we do bear a certain responsibility, and one of the themes in that 
responsibility is the hidden values in the theories and therapies that 
originated with us and contributl~ to the shaping of contemporary 
consciousness... We have been engaged in an enterprise that involves 
concealed positions on human values, moral postures, and even politics. 
This claim comes not just from unfriendly critics, it comes from 
responsible colleagues. This is the indictment that confronts those 
psychiatrists who assert that their psychiatry has nothing to do with these 
things; although the indictment can be overdrawn and viciously expressed, 
the fundamental truth in it cannot be gainsaid . Therefore, given the power 
of our enterprise, whether we like it or not we are in some measure 
responsible for the influence of thest! hidden values. It is also important to 
remember that many of us have wanted to use p5ychiatry to influence the 
public to confront and even to treat the sick society through the media. It is 
not just a matter of aloof scientists being victimized by the vulgarity of the 
mass media" (890). 
A scarcely less eminent authority, Professor R.H . Cawley of the 
University of London, in an article that we cited earlier, asserted frankly 
that psychiatry "is grounded in the humanities as well as [in] science", and 
therefore ultimately rooted in a certain philosophical outlook. Hence 
"much is to be gained by systematic exploration of the philosophical 
dimensions of p5ychiatry ". A major conclusion he comes to is: "Among 
the humanities, the one subject that may prove to have relevance to 
appropriate [psychiatric] theory and competent practice is philosophy. 
There is reason to believe that studies in philosophy in relation to 
psychiatry may in due course strengrhen the conceptual basis of the subject 
and enable the non-science a.~pects of p.~ychiatry to become orientated in 
the world of knowledge and thought" ("Psychiatry is More than a Science": 
British Journal of P5ychiatry, vol. 162 [1993] , 157-158; 160). 
26. It is significant to find tlh!se opinions, from such authoritative 
voices within the psychiatric profes ~;ion , insisting that theirs is not an exact 
science, but one which relies heavily on «value judgments», on philosophy 
and anthropology, and also on theses rooted in sociological premises. A 
recent article in the British Journal of P.~ychiatry (which holds that 
psychiatry "is a social practice") stresses "the new approach to psychiatric 
knowledge which has developed under the influence of social anthropology 
over the last decade", and asserts that psychiatry "is too socially embedded 
in the sense that it cannot examine its own institutional assumptions, and 
mistakes the particular for the universal" (R. Littlewood: "Against 
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Pathology. The New Psychiatry and Its Critics": British Journal of 
Psychiatry, vol. 159 [199 I] pp. 696, 699). 
27. In this context and in reference to DSM, a secular source notes: 
"Critics of DSM believe that the book regards too many normal human 
traits and behaviors as possible psychiatric illnesses. They are concerned 
that DSM authors sometimes use personal and social values, rather than 
scientific evidence, to judge whether behavior is abnormal" (Encarta 
Encyclopedia, loc cit. supra, no. 6). 
28. Reflecting on all of the above, the canonist's mind is naturally 
drawn to the 1987 Address of Pope John Paul II to the Roman Rota. There 
the Pope insisted on the ecclesiastical judge's responsibility, in marriage 
nullity cases, to detect and evaluate the anthropological or philosophical 
presuppositions that necessarily underl ie a psychiatric or psychological 
opinion. The main points of the Address were noted by G. Versaldi in an 
article published shortly after ("Momentum et consectaria allocution is 
Joannis Pauli II d. 5 februarii 1987" Periodica 77 [1988], pp. 109- I 48). 
Recalling the Popes words. "dialogue and a constructive communication 
between the judge and the psychiatrist or psychologist are easier if the 
frame of reference for both is a common anthropology, so that, even 
allowing for differences of method, interests and objectives, the approach 
of one is open to that of the other", Versaldi comments: 
John Paul II warns that before a Judge compares the Expert's 
conclusions with the other elements of the case, he should 
carefidly examine those anthropological presuppositions on 
which the expertise is based and lI ·hich can have a determining 
effect on its technical conclusions. Here the Pope is without any 
doubt indicating the impossibility (~l the psychological sciences 
being neutral, since they cannot in fact have a purely technical 
function, but need to look to the metaphysical-normative sciences 
for those first principles whose absence confines human nature 
within the limits of immanent phenomena. without any possibility 
of transcendence towards God. This necessary relationship with 
the metaphysical sciences in no way impairs the autonomy of the 
psychological science, which conserve their peculiar method and 
purpose, along with the limits of their competence, because "they 
cannot offer a their own truly integral concept of the human 
person" (no. 2). This view doubtlessly goes against the concept 
dominant in modern psychological schools of thought which hold 
that psychology should not only be autonomous, but even 
independent or neutral regarding any anthropological first 
principles. But. since such neutrality is impossible in practice, 
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these same schools construct anthropology, which is based on 
deterministic and immanentist ideas. 
In view of this, one sees clearly the need for a critical 
pondering by the judge of the anthropological principles in 
question. Without this pondering one can easily go astray, since 
the conclusions of the expert can be tarnished with these fal se 
elements. Hence a simple uncritical analysis of the conclusions is 
not enough, for, as the Pope says, ""the dialogue, having started on 
the basis of this initial ambiguity, can easily lead to conclusions 
which are false and harmful for the real good of individuals and 
of the Church" (no. 3). Hert' we touch on another important 
aspect of the Holy Father's address, which seems to have escaped 
the notice of many. He not only criticizes the unwarranted 
multiplication of declarations of nullity on grounds of psychic 
weakness, but also indicates the main cause of this, in the way 
that the judge is often lead a~.tray by psychological expertises. 
This erroneous appreciation does not relate directly to the 
expert's conclusions, but refers above all to the anthropological 
presuppositions which, however milch the experts may deny ii, 
are inevitably involved in the psychological analysis of persons 
(114-115). 
9. Is homosexuality a psychiatric disorder? What we have seen so 
far can help as we turn our attention more specifically to the evaluation of 
homosexuality in the secular psychiatric world . In the first editions of 
DSM, homosexuality was unambiguously classified as a mental disorder. 
In DSM-II , published in 1968. homosexuality is repeatedly listed under the 
heading of "Sexual deviations" (pp . 10,44, 79, 127). It appears first among 
these deviations, with the "Code number" 302.0, being followed by 
Fetishism (302 .1), Pedophilia (302.2), Transvestism (302.3), etc . (p. 44). 
Regarding all these deviations, the general observation is made: "Even 
though many find their practices distasteful , they remain unable to 
substitute nonnal sexual behavior for them" (ibid .). 
In 1973 , as noted above, the decis ion was taken by the governing 
body of the American Psychiatric Association to eliminate homosexuality 
from the category of a psychic disorder. DSM-III , published in 1980, while 
listing a whole series of "Psychosexual Disorders", including Transvestism 
(269) or Pedophilia (271), says that "homosexuality itself is not considered 
a mental disorder" and, more specifically, "Homosexuality that is ego-
syntonic is not classified as a mental disorder" (282). "Ego-dystonic 
homosexuality" is however categorized as a psychosexual disorder (261 ; 
281-282). This is explained on p. 359: "a homosexual arousal pattern that 
is unacceptable to the individual would be ego-dystonic, whereas, if the 
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individual were not distressed by the pattern and experienced it as 
acceptable, it would be ego-syntonic" (OSM-II1, p. 359). 
When we go on to OSM-II1-R (1987), we find that in the main text, 
homosexuali ty is not referred to at all. The only mention is in the end 
Index under "Ego-dystonic homosexuality" ([ndex: p. 560, p. 561), where 
the reader is referred to p. 296 of the text. However, the term 
"homosexuality" does not appear on p. 296, which deals very briefly with 
"Sexual disorder not otherwi se spec ified" . One is left to infer that the 
reference is to the third illustration given of this unspecified type of sexual 
disorder: "persistent and marked distress about one's sexual orientation". 
[n OSM-IV ( 1994) homosexuali ty is nowhere mentioned. In the 
Introduction to OSM-[V. one is struck by the open admission by the main 
editors that the many spec ia li sts who took part in its elaboration were 
selected for their readiness to participate in a highly organized "consensus" 
proj ect that would , it seems. presc ind (J priori from certain "previously 
held views" [which are not spec ified]. "OSM-IV was the product of 13 
Work Groups ... We took a number of precautions to ensure that the Work 
Group recommendations would re flect the breadth of available evidence 
and opinion and not just the views of the specific members ... We selected 
Work Group members who represented a wide range of perspectives and 
experiences. Work Group members were instructed that they were to 
participate as consensus scho lars and not as advocates of previously held 
views. Furthermore. we establi shed a formal evidence-based process for 
the Work Groups to follow" (xv). 
30. The 1993 article by Dr. Mitchell Wilson, quoted above, refers 
particularly to the homosexual issue as provoking the first of "public 
embarrassments of the profess ion which bore directly on the problem of 
diagnostic re liability [and] contributed to the near-crisis in the legitimacy 
of psychiatry in the early 1970s - the controversy over the disease status of 
homosexua lity. Increas ingly vocal gay rights organizations lobbied to have 
homosexuality removed from DSM-I1 . In 1973 the American Psychiatric 
Association Board of Trustees, afte r evaluation by the relevant hierarchy of 
APA components, voted to strike homosex uali ty from OSM . It was less 
c lear that this was a sc ientific issue than that it was, at least in part, a 
political one. The homosexua lity controversy seemed to show that 
psychiatric diagnoses were c lea rly wrapped up in social constructions of 
dev iance" (A merican JOllrnal ofhychiatry . vo l. 150 [1993] , 404). 
An ed itorial in the lead ing British psychiatric journal also cites the 
homosexua li ty issue as an example of how factors other than those which 
are properly scientific influence the shifting standards and parameters of 
modern psyc hiatry: "the boundaries of psychiatric conditions are constantly 
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shifting, much more often in response to socio-political pressures than to 
the accumulation of scientific evidence. A striking example is the majority 
vote of the American Psychiatric Association to exclude homosexuality 
from DSM-III" (Julian Leff: "The New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry", in 
British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 156 [1990], p. 305). 
The address referred to above of Dr. Alan A. Stone, Professor of 
Law and Psychiatry at Harvard University and 1980 President of the 
American Psychiatric Association, should be specially noted in this 
context. He considers homosexuality to be one of the most important 
instances where the moral appreciation underlying the common 
professional psychiatric assessment of a concrete pathological condition 
yielded to a campaign mounted by lobby interests, and adopted a new 
official approach which itself corresponds to a very different set of 
underlying "hidden values". 
One of the first great battlefields in the attack on 
psychiatry's hidden values was homosexuality. Psychiatrists had 
long assumed that as part of their humanistic trad.tion they had 
brought their scientific perspective to things that were once 
considered evil. Homosexuality became sickness rather than sin, 
and this perspective in this century was accepted not only by the 
secular masses but even by most religious authorities. However, 
gay liberation brought a different perspective. Their argument 
was that our judgments aJout homosexuality as sickness 
contained hidden values. a limited vision of human sensuality and 
intimacy, the old morality under a new guise, and perhaps even 
our own phobic limitations. A campaign was undertaken to 
remove the diagnosis of homosexuality from the nomenclature. 
Our Association, after consid '~ rable deliberation and not a little 
acrimony, accepted that persp,~dive . Our Association went even 
further - it called for an end to legal discrimination against 
homosexuality (American Journal ofP~ychiatry, vol 137 [1980] , 
890). 
After this analysis of how the American Psychiatric Association 
responded to "the effort to iri'fluence the public perception of 
homosexuality" , Dr. Stone concludes: "My analysis in no way is meant to 
demean the decisions our Association reached. Nor do I minimize the 
importance of what we did. It was not an empty gesture. But 1 believe the 
real significance of our actions once again was moral. We changed the 
moral element in our composite sketch of homosexuality" (ib. 891). 
Therefore, according to this prom ilnent scholar and psychiatrist, the new 
and radically changed "official" approach to homosexuality can in no way 
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be considered a truly scientific advance, since it was simply the political 
option of some within the profession, against the strenuous resistance of . 
others, to accommodate a new value judgment regarding the social 
acceptability of a homosexual condition. 
31 . It is not surprising then to see that canonical periti , who are so 
accustomed to refer to DSM when giving opinions about other anomalous 
conditions, now find such reference very difficult when the anomaly is 
homosexuality. This difficulty can already be partly detected in a rota I 
sentence of November 24, 1983 (vol. 75 , pp. 676ss). A more recent 
sentence of December 19. 1994 (vol. 86, p. 781), in accepting the expert 
opinion as basis for its conclusion that the respondent "had a tendency 
towards his own sex as an impulse he could not resist" and that in 
consequence the marriage was null (783). sums up this opinion so: 
The Expert considers it certain : a) "that the psychosexual 
behavior of Mr. Peter is not within the norm. He considers that it 
falls within the sphere of the DSM-lll disorder, no. 302.89"; b) 
"We are not in the presence of a 'permanent deviation of the 
personality of a homosexual type"'. but the respondent is under a 
"non-typical personality disorder according to the international 
DSM-1I1 classification ... a non-classified behavioral disorder, i.e. 
a disorder of identity and sexual behavior with features of a 
homosexual nature" ... (781). 
It could be considered peculiar that the peritus (in 1994!) chooses to refer 
back to DSM-III , published in 1980. Even then, he still has obvious 
difficulty in formulating his opinion according to the Manual. He makes 
no reference to the later editions . 
32. Homosexuality in Christion anthropology. On the one hand, then, 
it is clear that over the past twenty-five years the psychiatric profession, 
through the main official body representing it and in its main sponsored 
work, has completely changed the evaluation of homosexuality proposed 
from the viewpoint of psychic health . On the other hand, many prominent 
psychiatrists are not content with this "de-pathologizing" of homosexuality 
and openly assert that it is a response to ideological preference, not to 
scientific discovery. 
In any case. even if the majority of psychiatrists - for whatever 
reasons - were to conclude that homosexuality is no longer to be 
considered a disorder, Christian anthropology cannot accept this 
conclusion . According to the Christian understanding of man, human 
nature, weakened though not intrinsically corrupted by Original Sin, is 
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beset in almost all of its faculties and powers by disordered tendencies, 
whose presence there calls for a constant struggle (Denz. 1515). Every 
normal person experiences these disturbed tendencies in a particularly 
strong way in the whole area of sexuality. Hence the concept of 
"normality", in regard even to heterosexuality, is somewhat equivocal, for 
the "normal" heterosexual person also experiences disorders and must 
continuously strive to correct or check these deviations, so as to keep his or 
her balance in what is a basically turbulent situation. 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, treating of sexuality in 
general , insists that it needs proper integration into the existence of each 
person - a vital task that cannot be achieved without the exercise of the 
virtue of chastity and the use of human and supernatural means. "All the 
baptized are called to chastity [which] means the successful integration of 
sexuality within the person" ; "Chastity includes an apprenticeship in self-
mastery which is a training in human freedom. The alternative is clear: 
either man governs his passions and finds peace, or he lets himself be 
dominated by them and becomes unhappy" ; "Self-mastery is a long and 
exacting work. One can never consider it acquired once and for all. It 
presupposes renewed effort at all stages of life" (nos. 2348, 2337, 2339, 
2342). 
33. On this background, the Catechism goes on to speak of 
homosexuality. "Homosexuality refers to relations between men or 
between women who experience and exclusive or predominant sexual 
attraction toward persons of the same sex... Tradition has always declared 
that homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered. They are contrary to the 
natural law.. . Under no circumstances can they be approved". "The 
number of men and women who have deep-seated homosexual tendencies 
is not negligible. They do not choose their homosexual condition; for most 
of them it is a trial... These persons are called to fulfil God's will in their 
lives and, if they are Christians, to unite to the sacrifice of the Lord's Cross 
the difficulties they may encounter from their condition" . "Homosexual 
persons are called to chastity. By the virtues of self-mastery that teach 
them inner freedom , ... by prayer and sacramental grace, they can and 
should gradually and resolutely approach Christian perfection" (nos. 2357-
2359). 
The Church therefore holds that homosexuality is a disorder, 
whether considered as inclination or as conduct. It naturally distinguishes 
between homosexual tendency, which in itself has nothing blameworthy to 
it, and homosexual practice which is always sinful - just as it distinguishes 
between the strong but not consented temptation to infidelity in a married 
person, and actual adultery on that person's part. 
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From the moral perspective then, homosexuality is a disorder; even 
though, as a simple tendency, it is not a sin. While a Christian juridical 
perspective naturally accepts that homosexuality is a disorder, canonical 
jurisprudence is concerned not with the moral aspect of the disorder, but 
with its effect on fundamental issues of justice and personal rights -
including the capacity to exercise these rights. 
34. As a possible canonical grounds of the nullity of marriage, 
homosexuality is treated almost exclusively within the ambit of c. 1095. 
This should not be permitted to lead to a neglect of its possible relevance 
under the terms of c. 1098. If, in order to bring about marital consent, a 
person deliberately conceals a deep-rooted homosexual tendency, a prima 
facie case is already present for a declaration of nullity due to "dolus", 
since such a condition certainly "of its very nature can seriously disturb the 
partnership of conjugal life" (cfr. c. 1098). If what had been deliberately 
concealed were not just a homosexual tendency, but previous homosexual 
activity, the case would be so much stronger. In cases of homosexuality, 
proper use of c. 1098, where appropriate, might also avoid questionable 
applications or stretched interpretations of the terms of c. 1095. 
35 . As we saw from the principles enunciated earlier, jurisprudence is 
agreed that a grave homosexual condition present at consent can provoke 
consensual incapacity under c. 1095 , 3. Care must be taken however lest 
judgments in this field be too absolute. Otherwise there is the danger of 
converting certain psychic anomalies which provoke consensual incapacity 
in particular circumstances (when the anomaly is grave; when the married 
obligations for which it incapacitates are constitutionally essential) into 
matrimonial impediments in all circumstances - which is clearly not the 
legislator'S intent as expressed in c . 1095 . 
This caution applies to other conditions that are frequently dealt 
with under c. 1095 . A formal sentence of consensual incapacity not only 
takes away the ecclesial right to marry of the person so judged, but 
deprives anyone wishing to marry him or her of the same right, at least as 
regards the marriage desired . No one can marry a person incapable of 
valid marriage consent. While the point may have less importance in 
regard to no. 2 of c. 1095 (a "grave defect of discretion" can at times be of 
a transitory nature), it calls for attentive consideration with respect to 
certain chronic or constitutional conditions that are at times invoked as 
grounds for the "incapacity of assuming" of no. 3 of the canon. 
Jurisprudential interpretations in the sense that under c.l095, 3, 
grave kleptomania for instance. or chronic alcohol dependence, always 
incapacitates for valid marital consent, would imply that no one can validly 
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marry a professional thief or a chronic alcoholic. Even if one were fully 
aware of the crookery or alcoholism of another and nevertheless wanted to 
marry him or her, this would not be possible. Similarly, two alcoholics or 
two thieves who are in love with each other and wish to marry, would be 
impeded from doing so. The same would be true for two Obsessive-
Compulsives, two with a "Dependent Personality Disorder" or an "Anti-
Social Disorder" . The practical consequence of overbroad or careless 
jurisprudence in these matters would be in effect to set up new canonical 
matrimonial impediments. 
Declarations of nullity which correspond to truth and justice serve 
to protect and uphold ecclesial rights. Such rights however can be 
undermined if the principles underlying a declaration of nullity are not 
properly grounded in justice. It is only for very grave and solidly proven 
reasons that a person can be deprived of the natural and ecclesial right to 
marry (cf. c . 1058). The general principle, "laws which prescribe a 
penalty, or restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception to the 
law, are to be interpreted strictly" (c. 18), can never be forgotten in the 
jurisprudential interpretation and application of the canonical dispositions 
which limit consensual capacity for marriage . 
36. According to established jurisprudence, as we have noted, a mild 
or moderate homosexual condition does not justifY a declaration of 
consensual incapacity. Several reasons bear out the prudence of this. 
a) A "real" homosexual has an exclusive sexual attraction towards 
persons of the same sex and. at the same time, not simply a mere lack of 
such attraction but an actual repugnance regarding physical sexual 
relations with persons of the opposite sex. "When faced with a 
homosexual subject, a first question of major importance must always be 
made: that is, whether it is a case of a constitutional homosexual or of one 
that should be considered 'occasional'. To be justified in speaking of a real 
homosexual , i.e. of one who is constitutionally so, it is not enough that 
there be an attraction towards persons of the same sex. It is necessary that 
there also be a distaste for the other sex. Every homosexual who does not 
fulfil this last condition is probably an occasional homosexual. .. The true 
homosexual is an instinctual deviant in the proper sense of the term: 
everything occurs in him as if he were born of an element carrying sexual 
inversion in itself' (R. Zavalloni, Elementi di psicopat%gia educativa, 
1982, pp. 49-50). A declaration of incapacity for a valid marriage IS 
certainly not justified in the case of an "occasional homosexual" . 
b) to have (or to have had. in the past) a certain homosexual 
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tendency is by no means infrequent. Whether persons with such a 
tendency are properly classified under the heading of "bisexual" (having a 
sexual orientation towards people of either sex) is a question that may be of 
interest to the psychiatrist, but it is not important to the ecclesiastical 
judge, since it is clear that such persons cannot be barred from exercising 
the right to marry. Their natural attraction to marriage remains and, if they 
marry, their usual motive is love for their partner. A recent study in a 
psychological review makes this point (also in relation to lesbians): "The 
great majority of bisexual or lesbian women reported that they got married 
because they were in love with their husbands and desired marriage ... 
studies indicate that their marriages may be no more conflicted than 
heterosexual marriages" (Dr. Eli Coleman: "The Married Lesbian": 
Marriage and Family Review, vol. 14 (1989), pp. 121; 132). 
c) the sentence of the appeal court in the case before us seems to 
look positively on the thesis that one can "speak of a homosexual tendency 
of antecedent gravity, and for this very reason incompatible with the 
assumption of matrimonial life" (II , 64). Here there is the danger of failing 
to distinguish not only between tendency and practice, but also between a 
bad tendency, which simply reflects fallen nature, and the curbing of that 
tendency which, along with showing moral strength, can also be inspired 
by love for one's partner. 
There can be no grounds for holding that an immoral tendency, if 
resisted, can incapacitate a person for the undertaking or fulfillment of any 
essential marital obligation. Otherwise it would follow that someone very 
subject to sexual temptation is incapable of validly marrying, since he or 
she will go through married life with a constant urge to infidelity -
although he is also determined to resist those temptations and has hitherto 
normally succeeded in doing so. This is surely not correct. Moreover, 
even if occasional falls were to occur during actual married life, it would 
seem impossible to conclude with certainty that this was due to incapacity, 
and not just to difficulty . 
"A natural tendency can be irreversible without one's way of living 
necessarily following it. For either the supernatural struggle or the 
Christian 'sublimation' of the inclination can lead the person upward. After 
all, a genuine Christian life resists so many impulses of nature!" (c. Huot, 
Jan. 3 I , 1980: vol. 72, p. 85). 
Therefore a tendency cannot be held to cause incapacity. We all 
have tendencies to act perversely. For the juridic proof"of consensual 
incapacity, what has to be established is not the anomaly or pathology of 
having wrong tendencies, nor even that of yielding to them (which per se 
simply shows a voluntary giving way to a bad moral inclination), but the 
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anomaly of not being capable of resisting them. 
Nor is this clear principle undermined by an expert opinion to the 
effect that the tendency in question is "constitutional" or "inherited". If the 
tendency is held in check, so that a person's conduct remains within the 
norm, the tendency cannot incapacitate. It is not a tendency which one 
manages to control, but conduct which one cannot control, that can sustain 
an allegation of incapacity under c. 1095, 3 . 
d) The mutual exchange of the right to true conjugal acts is 
essential to the constitution of marriage. According to c. 1084, § l , 
impotence or the inability to have sexual intercourse makes a valid 
marriage impossible (although the application of this rule to the marriage 
of an aged person is beset with evident difficulties) . However, while the 
simple ability to perform the act is required, mainstream rotal 
jurisprudence has consistently refused to endorse any suggestion that the 
ability to give or derive sexual satisfaction through the act is an essential 
obligation under c. 1095. Thus, as regards frigidity in a woman (which is 
not accepted as a form of impotence: cfr. c. Pinto, July 15, 1977: vol. 69, p. 
407), even tentative suggestions that it might be regarded as an incapacity 
for some essential matrimonial obligation under c. 1095, 3 have gathered 
no support (cfr. c. Serrano, July 28, 1981: vol. 73 , p. 428), also no doubt 
because any such thesis could be held to show an element of sexual 
discrimination . 
A homosexual tendency may render the conjugal act less 
satisfactory to one or both spouses, just as frigidity in the wife does. But 
(always allowing for the possible relevance of c. 1098) a "less than ideal" 
ability to perform the act offers no basis for a declaration of consensual 
incapacity under c. 1095. 
Two older persons for whom the physical side of marriage - the 
actual conjugal act - is possibly of little or practically no interest, have the 
right to marry, even if this lack of interest derives from a rooted 
homosexual condition that was always present in one or other party. 
e) If Church jurisprudence were to hold that any degree of 
homosexual inclination incapacitates for exercising the legitimate right to 
marry, this could be held discriminatory also in regard to the rights of 
homosexuals themselves. It would deprive them of the possibility of 
marrying someone whom they wish to marry and who, despite their 
condition, wishes to be united in marriage with them. From the 
supernatural point of view, they would be deprived of the special 
sacramental graces of marriage, which are such a powerful help to 
salvation and holiness. 
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A psychologist with broad experience in this field writes: "I have 
had contact with more than one homosexual whose marriage had been a 
great help in avoiding homosexual adventures and in [avoiding] 
abandoning himself to other neurotic inclinations. The situation of many 
married homosexuals is identical with that of other married neurotics. It is 
sensible to warn a homosexual as well as his future marriage partner of the 
difficulties they will almost certainly face if they decide to marry, but it 
must not be an iron rule to discourage such intended marriages" (Gerard 
J .M. van den Aardweg: On the Origins and Treatment of Homosexuality, 
Praeger, New York, 1986, p. 147). 
We also note the observation of a first instance judge in a recent 
case which came to the Rota. He rejected the automatic assumption "that 
any person who is homosexual is unfit for a valid marriage... If this were 
the practical norm, then as a matter of policy and without respect to their 
human dignity and rights, such persons must never be permitted to marry to 
begin with ; but such a policy would be against the person's natural right to 
seek out marriage as their call in life, not to mention that such a practice 
would be against the laws of the Church." 
37. Some brief comment should be made regarding the DSM-III 
distinction between "ego-dystonic" and "ego-syntonic" homosexuality, 
uncritically accepted by the court expert and the judges in second instance 
in the case before us. 
"Ego-dystonic" is used by DSM-III to indicate "a symptom or 
personality trait that is recognized by the individual as unacceptable and 
undesirable and is experienced as alien... A homosexual arousal pattern 
that is unacceptable to the individual would be ego-dystonic, whereas, if 
the individual were not distressed by the pattern and experienced it as 
acceptable, it would be ego-syntonic" (DSM-II1, p. 359). According to this 
criterion, therefore, the homosexual who is "ego-syntonic" about his or her 
condition (i .e. who is not distressed by it but finds it acceptable), is not to 
be considered as suffering from any type of psychic liability (ibid. , p. 282). 
38. The idea that people can be in syntony - in positive emotional 
response - with any sort of tendency or conduct, is a logical consequence 
of the current philosophy of "self-definition", which opposes the notion of 
a given human nature, common to all , and therefore cannot accept that 
certain actions are "natural" and others "anti-natural". It holds that each 
person rather has the absolute right to define oneself, one's goals, and the 
parameters of personal conduct which one considers "acceptable"; all of 
which undoubtedly facilitates the ego-syntonic goal of "being at peace with 
oneself' . In this view, conscience loses its character as a higher, 
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independent and critical voice of truth, and is reduced to an ego-
syntonically regulated stamp of approval placed by the subject on whatever 
he or she wants to do. 
The Church has always rejected this total moral subjectivism, this 
self-threatening current of thought in which freedom is exalted "to such an 
extent that it becomes an absolute, which would then be the source of 
values ... in this way the inescapable claims of truth disappear, yielding 
their place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity and ' being at peace with 
oneself ... " (Veritatis Splendor, no. 32). 
39. Even if morality is left aside, two questions can be posed from the 
purely psychological point of view. First, is it possible that a person can 
feel "ego-syntonic" - that is, completely "at peace" and experiencing no 
personal distress at all - about any ac/ion or form of conduc/ wha/soever 
that he or she claims to consider acceptable: murder or rape, for instance? 
Secondly, if one allows that this is possible, can such subjective 
tranquillity about objectively inhuman conduct be taken as a sign of 
psychic normality, or ought it rather not be considered proof of grave 
mental pathology? 
40 . As in the case of the other "human sciences" (cfr. Gaudium et Spes, 
5, 62; Apostolicam Actuositatem, 32; Octogesima Adveniens, nn. 38-40, 
etc.), the Church from the time of the 1941 Address of Pius XII to the Rota 
(AAS 33 423) has been cautiously positive in her approach to the rapid 
growth in scope and influence of modem psychiatry and psychology 
(Christus Dominus, 14; Gravissimus Educa/ . I; Optatam Totius, 2-3 , 20). 
The legitimate analyses and suitable therapies proposed by these 
sciences can help diagnose and remedy the objective or subjective 
deficiencies of a psychic order which each person inevitably experiences in 
different stages or particular circumstances of life . In the past decades 
many local churches have felt the need for having psychological 
counsellors, in schools, seminaries, marriage or family centers, diocesan 
tribunals, etc. Persons already in the service of the diocese are now 
frequently selected for professional training in these fields . 
The results have not in all cases been as positive as hoped for. The 
main concern which has emerged relates not so much to methods and 
therapies, as to the underlying views of man dominant in current 
psychology or psychiatry as well as in most faculties and schools which 
form people for the psychiatric or psychological professions: views that 
profoundly shape both theoretical understanding and practical approach 
regarding major anthropological questions such as fulfillment, freedom, 
identity, autonomy, dependence, commitment, sexuality, etc. 
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41. Particular dangers can arise in processes which examine pleas of 
the nullity of a marriage. From Pope John Paul II's addresses, it is clear 
that he wants ecclesiastical tribunals to be particularly attentive to them. In 
1987, speaking to the Roman Rota, he warned of the "the very grave 
danger ... as regards decisions about the nullity of marriage" if the judge, 
unaware that "the anthropological view which underpins so many currents 
of thought in the field of modern psychological science is as a whole 
irreconcilable with the essential elements of Christian anthropology", were 
to give judicial weight to expertises based on false anthropological 
presuppositions (AAS 79 [1987] 1454-155). 
Expertises used by tribunals must therefore reflect a Christian 
anthropology. In other words, the "values" which shape or condition their 
view of man (so providing the anthropological basis to their psychological 
or psychiatric inquiry into questions of psychic health ["normality"], 
illness, cure, etc.) must be in thorough harmony with the faith. Following 
the Pope's indication, a first concern of judges, at the moment of choosing 
an expert no less than at that of examining his opinion, is to grasp and 
evaluate the underlying anthropological principles and values which his 
approach and method reflect. 
It is not possible to be in a position to discharge this special 
responsibility without a constant care for one's own Christian 
anthropological formation. This calls for deep familiarity with the growing 
richness of modern Christian anthropology which, with its age-old roots, 
casts an ever clearer light on all aspects of man's personal and social life. 
At the same time it confers a critical capacity in regard to modem 
psychological theories and therapeutical practices, so that one can 
distinguish what is in harmony with the view of human nature that the 
Church has always proposed, what is doubtfully compatible with this view, 
and what is clearly at variance with it. 
42. As happens in practice, a Church tribunal may seek and receive an 
expert opinion submitted by a psychiatrist or psychologist of considerable 
prestige; or an expert may seek to strengthen his opinion with abundant 
reference to psychological or psychiatric studies, manuals or textbooks 
which are highly regarded by certain professionals (but perhaps not by 
others, as is exemplified by the case of DSM). Well and good; but if the 
opinion itself, or the works to which it refers in support, reflect a view of 
man out of harmony with that held by Christianity, the theses and analyses 
given may hinder rather than help the just solution of the case before the 
court. However well worked and documented an opinion, if it is inspired 
by a secularist view of man, it can be quite useless or thoroughly 
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misleading to an ecclesiastical court charged with the responsibility of 
judging capacity for matrimonial consent. If a judge lacks a due grasp of 
Christian anthropology, he is not likely to advert to the operative values 
underlying each expertise, or be able to fulfill his mission of deciding 
whether or not they are acceptable and applicable from a Christian point of 
view. 
43. The insistence on the possession and application of Christian 
anthropological standards calls on court experts too, to check on their own 
working presuppositions. Not all experts whose serv ices are regularly used 
by tribunals seem to be as aware as might be expected of the fact that while 
most of secular psychology considers certain dispositions or practices to be 
mutually incompatible or exclusive, Christian thought sees them as 
complementary and intrinsically designed for integration: freedom and 
commitment, for instance; or self-fulfillment and self-denial, "autonomy" 
and "relatedness", maturity and dependence. Secular psychologists quite 
regularly see "over-dependence" or "over-acceptance" as signs of an 
immature personality. A Catholic would be extremely cautious about 
applying such a criterion, above all when it comes to judging capacity for 
marriage which, in a Christian understanding, is a way of life that calIs for 
a high degree of both mutual acceptance and mutual dependence. 
The relationship between frequently invoked psychological 
concepts, such as "self-esteem" and "freedom from shame or guilt" , or 
"self-doubt" and "self-actualization", would probably be interpreted quite 
differently according to whether one has a Christian or a secularist 
anthropological outlook. The same would hold no doubt for the nature and 
psychological evaluation of "self-image" or "self-assertion", or for the 
concepts of "validation" or of "healing" . Similarly the parameters used to 
evaluate "sexual identity" would most probably not be identical (cfr. Malta 
sentence coram the undersigned of July 23 , 1998, nos. 5-7). 
44. One would expect court experts to show - and to communicate to 
judges - greater awareness of the differences and doubts abounding in the 
psychiatric and psychological professions. Judges would then be in a 
better position to weigh the certainty - whether of a scientific or a 
probatory nature - that is due to specialized terminology or particular 
manuals used, or to concrete opinions given in an expertise. It must be said 
nevertheless that to find a court expert express a "caveat" in this sense, 
such as that regarding DSM in the decision c. Ragni of May 19, 1992 (n. 
18 above), is a rare Occurrence. 
45. No criticism of the invaluable role played by so many psychiatrists 
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and psychologists is implied in suggesting that when some among them 
claim that their professions operate from a strictly scientific and "value-
free" basis, the onus lies on them to substantiate the claim; for, as we have 
shown, it is contested by many distinguished figures from within the 
professions themselves, who even hold that it is not possible for psychiatry 
or psychology to be "value-free" in fact. No ecclesiastical judge can afford 
to be unaware of or ignore the very discordant views on this which exist 
within these fields. Recalling what the Harvard Professor, Dr. Alan A. 
Stone, said in 1980 in relation to psychiatry (no. 25 above), we quote from 
a recent article in a major psychological review which holds that there is 
"an increased awareness concerning the role of values in psychology", and 
a consequent reaction among psychologists against "the legacy of value-
free doctrines" (Isaac Prilleltensky: "Values, Assumptions, and Practices": 
American Psychologist, vol. 52 [1997], p. 517). 
46. The importance of these questions to church tribunals should be 
evident, nor is there any need to posit the unlikely hypothesis that some 
judge might unconsciously consider that jurisprudence should be 
subordinate to the "scientific certainties" of psychiatry or psychology. 
From the canonical viewpoint, the simple fact is that these ongoing debates 
touch directly on anthropological issues central to cases heard under c. 
1095, for they concern the fundamental parameters of human development 
and personal maturing. 
47. One would be greatly hampered in serving both the Church and 
humanity if one were unaware of the state of recurrent uncertainty and 
problematic change that characterizes so much of modem secular 
psychology and reveals its limited human resources and its narrowed frame 
of reference. The following passage from another recent article could be 
emblematic of how the proper identification of a real problem can be 
followed by an inadequate [dialectical] analysis, without a substantial or 
time-tested solution being offered. "Traditionally, the indigenous 
psychologies of Western industrialized cultures have stressed the 
importance of the development of individuality, autonomy, independence, 
achievement motivation, and identity as essential components of 
psychological maturity. Social critics suggest that these values have also 
led to a long-standing and intensifying crisis of alienation in the Western 
world ... Within psychology, the tradition of emphasizing the importance of 
the development of the self and of identity over the development of social 
relations has increasingly been challenged by theorists interested in 
attachment, psychoanalytic object relations, feminism, and non-Western 
psychologies" (S. Guisinger and S. J. Blatt: "Individuality and Relatedness: 
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Evolution of a Fundamental Dialectic" : American Psychologist, vol. 49 
[1994], p. 104). 
It is perhaps even more for what it omits, than for what it says, that 
this passage seemed worth quoting. A psychology properly rooted in the 
Christian faith has very much indeed to contribute to such questions being 
debated among secular psychologists, precisely because it has always 
placed the "development of self' and the "development of social [i.e. 
interpersonal] relations" side by side, and as necessarily interdependent, 
being in fact expressions of the same virtue of charity which harmonizes 
love for self with love for others. As the Cathechism of the Catholic 
Church says: "Through the exchange with others, mutual service and 
dialogue with his brethren, man develops his potential ; he thus responds to 
his vocation" (no. 1879). 
48 . Perspectives begin to broaden indefinitely at this stage, as one's 
realization grows of how deeply contemporary psychiatry and psychology 
are in need of the view of man offered by Christian anthropology. To 
pursue that aspect further, however, is not of our present competence. 
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